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The Barrister News is published four ( 4) times each year 
by the Student Bar Association, St. Mary 's University School 
of Law, San Antonio, Texas . Address all correspondence, 
subscriptions, or changes of address to Barrister News, Edi -
torial and Executive Office, Maverick Clarke Building, San 
Antonio, Texas. Reproduction in any matter, in whole or in 
part, in English or other languages, is expressly prohibited 
without written permission from the Barrister News, St . Mary ' s 
School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. 
EDITOR'S DESK 
The graduation of Jim Lytton, our former 
Editor in Chief, has climaxed his outstanding record 
of academic achievement, and although the staff 
of the "Barrister News" extends sincere congratula-
tions to him, we also feel a pang of regret for the 
loss of his capable leadership. We wish him con-
tinued success in his future. 
I wish to announce the appointment of Edmund 
Anderson and Leonard Giblin as Associate Editors, 
and the addition of David Sanderford and Bill Casey 
to the Editorial Staff. I believe they will prove an 
ass·et to the "Barrister News." 
The Editor 
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THE COVER 
The Law Day banquet held May 12th 1n the 
St. Anthony Hotel's Anacacho Room. 
(left to right) The Very Reverend louis J. Blume stands with awardees Dr. Abner McCall, Broth er 
Thomas Treadaway, and Judge Ernest Belcher. 
AWARDS PRESENTED 
AT 
LAW DAY BANQUET 
One of the highlight of St. Mary's University's 
11th Annual Law Day Celebration, held on May 
12th, was the Banquet at San Antonio's St. Anthony 
Hotel, the keypoint of which was the Awards 
Presentation. 
The St. Thomas More Award, which is present-
ed for" exceptional contribution to legal education, 
the legal profession, and to government," is the Law 
School's highest award. This year's recipients were 
Baylor University President Dr. Abner McCall and 
Brother Thomas Treadaway, S.M., Registrar and Di-
rector of Admissions of St. Mary's University for 
twenty-nine years. 
The Rosewood Gavel Award, presented annually 
to an outstanding jurist of the state or nation, was 
awarded to Judge Ernest Belcher of the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals. 
After the presentations, Dr. McCall addressed 
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the assembly, which in addition to the Law School 
faculty and student body and their guests, included 
such dignitaries as St. Mary's University President 
The Very Reverend Louis J. Blume; Earnest A. 
Raba, Dean of the Law School; The Very Reverend 
James Young, President of the Board of 
Trustees of St. Mary's University; Chief Justice 
Robert W. Calvert of the Supreme Court of Texas; 
and Associate Justices James R. Norvell, Zollie 
Steakley, Meade Griffin, Jack Pope, Ruel Walker, 
~nd Joe Greenhill, all of the Supreme Court; and 
Presiding Judge of the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals K. p. Woodley, and Justice Charles Barrow 
of the Fourth Court of Civil Appeals. 
In his address, Dr. McCall said that the United 
States is a country made up of minorities which dis-
agree among themselves in many ways and upon 
many premises. "However," said Dr. McCall, "the 
one thing upon which we all agree is our established 
system of law. Due process is the basis upon which 
we proceed to reach our goals-by following our 
judicial system of procedure. Today, we have groups 
of people who do not want to follow these established 
procedures." 
Dr. McCall designated these groups as some of 
the deadliest enemies of our country, for a break-
down of our established pr ocedures would, he said, 
bring about a destruction of not only our system 
of law, but our way of life: "our advocacy system is 
representative of our American system-that is an 
airing of conflicting opinions and a resulting dis-
covery of a solution." 
"These groups,'' continued Dr. McCall, "want 
to aborgate our system of peacably airing conflic-
ing opinions, and substitute a system by which they 
shout down opinions opposed to their own. And 
by denying persons with opposing views the right 
to be heard, these groups, which strangely enough 
seem to come from college campuses, are doing more 
to destroy our system than any other force. We 
need not fear those who blatently assert that they 
will cause the downfall of the system, for all good 
men will rise to put them down. But these groups 
that wear fine lables and parade ostensibly for in-
dividual rights or worldwide peace, threaten to 
destroy our American ideals centered around the 
proposition that a peaceful discussion of conflicting 
opinions gives rise to an amicable agreement." 
In conclusion, Dr. McCall added, "From law 
America derived a sense of procedure and a willing-
ness to abide by it. It is not a procedure which gov-
erns disagreements, but one which governs what 
methods we should use to disagree-the arriving at 
truths by harmonious debate and dialogue, without 
force or violence." 
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THE AWARDS 
ABOVE, Dean of the Law School Earnest A. Raba is 
shown holding the awards which were presented at 
the Law Day Banquet. The St. Thomas More Award, 
a bronze plaque, is an annual award which is pre-
sented upon the recommendation of the Law School 
Executive Council to the University Administration to 
an outstanding citizen of the nation for his or her 
outstanding achievement during the academic year in 
the field of law or in his or her contribution to the 
legal profession. The award is restricted to judges, 
lawyers, law teachers, and laymen who have made 
exceptional contributions to legal education, the 
profession, or to government. 
Some of the former recipients of the St. Thomas More 
Award include James R. Norvell, Associate Justice of 
the Texas Supreme Court; Judge K. K. Woodley, Pre-
siding Judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and 
W . Page Keeton, Dean of Texas University Law School. 
Some of the past recipients of the Rosewood Gavel 
Award, which is presented by the Law School each 
year to an outstanding jurist of the state or nation in 
recognition of his contribution to the democratic 
process, are Robert w. Calvert, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Texas, James R. Norvell, Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas; and J. E. 
Hichman, past Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Texas. 
THE RECIPIENTS 
Dr. Abner McCall's St. Thomas More 
Award is presented by Justice James 
R. Norvell . 
Brother Thomas Treadaway receives 
his St. Thomas More Award from 
the Very Reverend James Young. 
The Rosewood Gavel is presented to 
Judge Ernest Belcher by Judge K. K. 
Woodley. 
Jim Lytton receives his award 
from Justice 'Norvell. 
Dick Clarkson receives his 
award. 
LYTTON, CLARKSON WIN 
MOOT COURT COMPETITION 
Jim Lytton and Richard Clarkson were the 
winners of the annual Moot Court competition at St. 
Mary's University School of Law. From this win, 
the second year for Jim, they went on to the semi-
final Moot Court competition of the State of Texas. 
Mike Bahan, whose br ief was selected by the 
judges as the best submitted, also won the position 
as the alternate team member. 
The other competitors were: Bob McConachie, 
Bill Hyder, Gerald Lopez, Brock Shamberg, and 
Wayland Simmons. 
The problem presented in the competition was 
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whether the fully and partially vested portions in 
a private profit-sharing plan were property. The 
plaintiff was the daughter by a former marriage of 
defendant's deceased wife, and, suing through her 
guardian, she argued that both vested and non-
vested amounts were property, and constituted 
community property. 
Defendant argued that none of the portions in 
the plan were property, because of conditions and 
impossibility of calculation into an amount capable 
of adjudication. 
UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS 
by Lloyd Bingham, recent graduate of St. Mary's Law Scho o l, and this year's recipient of the U.S. Law Week Awa rd 
As a general rule the parties to a contract are 
free to make whatever contracts they please, so 
long as there is no fraud or illegality.1 However 
courts of equity have for many years consistently 
refused to enforce contracts which they deemed 
to be "unconscionable.''2 The draftsmen of the Uni-
form Commercial Code sought to eliminate the in-
herent uncertainty that prevailed as a result of the 
common law courts reliance on indirect equitable 
means such as adverse construction of language or 
public policy to strike down unconscionable contracts. 
Section 2-302 (1) provides that: 
"If the court as a matter of law finds the 
contract or any clause of the contract to have 
been unconscionable at the time it was made the 
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it 
may enforce the remainder of the contract with-
out the unconscionable clause ... " 
As a result of this section, courts are now able 
to pass directly on the unconscionability of a con-
tract and to make a "conclusion of law" as to 
whether a contract or a particular clause is un-
conscionable.3 By removing the element of uncons-
cionablility from the realm of the .iury, the drafts-
men of the Uniform Commercial Code have paved 
the way for the development and accumulation of 
precedents which should provide the certainty and 
predictability needed in this area of the law. 
Although, as some of its critics have pointed 
out, Section 2-302 does not define "unconscionable," 
the intent of the draftsmen is clearly to prevent 
unfair surprise and oppression, and not to disturb 
the allocation of fair risks resulting from superior 
bargaining power.4 Thus a party who ultimately 
ends up with a "bad bargain" can not gain any 
relief from this section as long as the contract, 
at the time it was made, was not unconscionable. 
The tests of the section are to be applied in the 
light of the commercial setting and surrounding 
circumstances as of the time the contract was 
executed. A contract will not be struck down as 
unconscionable unless it is grossly unreasonable as 
viewed from the standard of normal necessary busi-
ness practice for the type of contract involved.5 
Unconscionability includes the absence of mean-
ingful choice on the part of one of the parties to 
the contract together with contract terms which 
are unreasonably favorable to the other party.6 
Although the question of unconscionability is 
one for the court, Section 3-202 (2) affords a party 
a reasonable opportunity to present evidence to the 
j udge so as to aid the court in making the deter-
mination as to whether or not a contract provision 
is unconscionable. A federal district court in Penn-
sylvania7 recently reversed and remanded the find-
ings of a referee in bankruptcy that a security 
agreement entered into between A and B was un-
conscionable where A was not afforded an oppor-
tunity to submit evidence to the effect that the 
security agreement was not onerous or unconscion-
able as claimed. 
The recent New York case of Frostifr esh Corp. 
v. Reynoso,8 which was decided solely on the ground 
of Section 2-302, illustrates the type of situation 
which this section is intended to control. In the 
Frostifresh case, Plaintiff brought suit against De-
fendant on a refrigerator-freezer purchased from 
Plaintiff. The sales contract was negotiated orally 
in Spanish between Defendant and a Spanish speak-
ing salesman for Plaintiff. Evidence was admitted 
showing that the salesman deluded the Defendant 
by advising him that the freezer would cost him 
nothing because Defendant would be paid $25.00 
bonuses on numerous sales that would be made to 
his friends. Defendant then signed a retail install-
ment contract written entirely in English which 
he could not read and which was not explained to . 
him. The contract called for a cash price of $900.00 
plus a credit charge of $245.00. Plaintiff admitted 
that the freezer only cost him $340.00. The court 
held that they had the power under Section 2-302 
to refuse to enforce the price and credit provi-
sions of the contract in order to prevent an un-
conscionable result. The court stated that in their 
opinion this was "too hard a bargain." Defendant 
was handicapped by a lack of knowledge both as 
to the commercial situation and the nature and 
terms of the contract which were submitted in a 
language foreign to him. The service charge alone 
almost equaled the cost of the freezer---clear evi-
dence of the oppression which was practiced on 
Defendant. 
(Continued on Page 18) 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927). 
2. Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Sparks, 132 Ind. App. 145, 172 N.E. 2d 899 (1961); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz 172 F.2d .<3d Cir. 1948); Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packmg Cor-poration, 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937). 
3. Section 2-302 U.C.C. comment #1 (1962). 
4. Ibid. 
5. Casenote, 45 Virginia Law Review 583 (1959). 
6. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 121 App. D.C. 315, 350 F.2d 445 (Ct. ot App., D.C. 1965) 
7. In re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966) . 
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(LEFT TO RIGHT) Bill Hyder, Magister; Charles 
Roberts, Alumni Coordinator; Steve Ha.,ris, Exchequer; 
Bill Harris, Clerk; and Jack McGinnis, Historian. 
TOP ROW: Raymond Taylor, Herschel Moore, Gordon 
Sauer, Michael Smith, James Guess, Allen Lawrence, 
Edmund Anderson. SECOND ROW: Lewis Vandiver, 
Barry Edelman, Joe Westheimer, Harry Schultz, Phil 
Benson. BOTTOM ROW: J. B. Marshall, Morris Reese, 
Michael Donahue, Richard Glaser, Leonard Giblin, 
Jeff Morehouse, Edga·r Duncan is not pictured. 
PHI DELTA PHI SPRING REPORT 
By Bill Harris, Clerk of Phi Delta Phi 
Tarlton Inn of Phi Delta Phi legal fraternity 
enjoyed a highly successful semester this past 
spring. The Spring banquet, the initiation of twenty 
new members, and a wealth of individual honors 
were high points of an industrious semester. 
Election of officers was first on the business 
agenda. Heading our administration for the school 
year 1967-68 will be the following: Bill H.yd~r, 
Magister; Steve Harris, Exchequer; Jack McG1nn1s~ 
Historian; Bill Harris, Clerk; and Charlie Roberts, 
Alumni Coordinator. Kelton Conner had the "hard 
luck" to be selected as our chapter's delegate to the 
national convention to be held in Miami, Florida, 
September 4-7, 1967. 
Highlighting the social calendar was the annual 
Spring Banquet and Rush Party held at the Petrol-
eum Club in the Alamo National Bank Building. The 
Honorable Jack Pope, Associate Justice of the Su-
prem·e Court of Texas was the guest speaker. Good 
food. fellowship and fun was the order of the day 
for the more than two hundred fifty Phi Delta Phi 
members and their guests. Among the special guests 
was our Province President, Merrell Frazer, Jr., of 
Tyler, Texas. 
Initiation of new members of Phi Delta Phi 
was held May 12, 1967, in the Fourth Court of Civil 
Appeals. Assisting as Benchers in the ceremonies 
were: Justice James R. Norvell and Joe Greenhill 
of the Texas Supreme Court, Judge Archie S. Brown, 
144th District Court, Bexar County, and Mr. James 
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Castleberry and Mr. Orville Walker, both of the 
St. Mary's law faculty. The following outstanding 
students were initiated into Phi Delta Phi: Edmund 
Anderson, Phil Benson, Michael Donahue, Edgar 
Duncan, Barry Edelman, Leonard Giblin, Richard 
Glaser, James Guess, Frank Johnson, Allen Law-
rence, Jeff Marshall, Herschel Moore, Jeff More-
house, Morris Reese, Gordon Sauer, Harry Schulz, 
Michael Smith, Raymond Taylor, Lewis Vandiver, 
and Joe Westheimer. 
The celebration of Law Day at St. Mary's School 
of Law is always a grand occasion. It was even more 
so this year, as the A wards Ceremonies and Cocktail 
Party were held in the new, nearly-completed class-
room building in the new law complex on the Wood-
lawn campus. As our portion of the program, Phi 
Delta Phi was proud to present awards: to our 
past Magister, Mike Moriarity, Tarlton Inn's Out-
standing Graduate for 1966-67; to Jim Lytton, 
Phi Delta Phi Member-of-the-Year (for national 
competition); to Mr. James Castleberry, our faculty 
advisor, recognition for his contribution to the work 
of our chapter; and to Marty Beirne, Outstanding 
Freshman Student for 1966-67. 
The chapter congratulates its graduating 
seniors upon their successful completion of their 
law studies: Mike Bahan, John Courtney, Selden 
Hale, Jim Lytton, Mike Moriarity, Ed Taylor, Don 
Williams, and Charles Wright. The example . they 
have set is a credit both to St. Mary's School of Law 
and to Phi Delta Phi Legal Fraternity. 
Delta Theta Phi 
Spring Report 
By Richard J. Clarkson, Tribune of Delta Theta Phi 
On April 30th Bickett Senate held its initiation 
and is proud to announce the following new mem-
bers: Harry Ben Adams, III, Ben Barton, Bennie W. 
Bock, III, Wendell D. Calvert, Joe A. Cisneros, Don-
ald J. Driscoll, Dr. Ramiro P. Estrada, Charles T. 
Felder, Rupert F. Horka, Shelby Hollin, Gerald 
Huff, Michael P. Kaliski, Richard G. Morales, Donald 
R. Pozzi, Thomas Rocha, Jr., Luis M. Segura, Gus 
J. Strauss, Robert Wehmeyer, Leslie Williams, Jr., 
and Marvin B. Zimmerman. The ceremony was held 
in the courtroom of the U.S. District Judge Ernest 
Guinn. Alumni and members of Bickett Senate were 
present to preside in the function and welcome our 
new brothers. 
At St. Mary's annual Law Day, Robert W. 
Coffin, Dick H. Guinn and Michael T. LaHood re-
ceived Delta Theta Phi awards for service to school 
and fraternity. Marcel C. Notzon received the L·eslie 
Merrem award for service to school, fraternity and 
scholastic excellence. In a d d i t i o n to the many 
brothers and alumni present to help celebrate Law 
Day, we were delighted to have the company of Mr. 
Jim Brady, area representative to the national head-
quarters of Delt a Theta Phi. Mr. Brady gave a party 
for De!ta Thetas in Lake McQueeney on June 2nd. 
This summer, Delta Theta Phi will be holding 
its 35th biennial convention in Anaheim, California 
on August 13 through 16. Bickett Senate will be 
represented by Richard J. Clarkson. 
Mr. Luther E. Jones, Jr., prominent Texas ap-
pellate lawyer, has been invited to give the princi-
pal address to Bickett Senate's Fall rush party. 
Bickett Senate plans a very impressive affair to 
coincide with the opening of the new law school 
facilities. 
(Left to Right) BOTTOM ROW: Joe Chapa, Wes 
Kuize, Mike Schill. MIDDLE ROW: Dick Guinn, Joe 
Bonney, Kirby Ambler, John Davis, Jim Dunn. TOP 
ROW: Paul Richmond, Pat Thomas, Dick Clarkson, 
Don Hendrie. 
(Left to Right) BOTTOM ROW: Rupert Horka, Tom 
Rocha, Don Puzzi, Bob Wehmeyer, Dr. Estrada, Ben-
nie Bock. MIDDLE ROW: Cha·rles Felder, Gus Strauss, 
Shelby Hollin, Mike Kaliski, Joe Cisneros, Luis Segura, 
Marvin Zimmerman. TOP ROW: Ben Barton, Gerald 
Huff, Harry Adams, Don Driscoll, Les Williams. 
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The Class of 1967 
has graduated, and it is 
w'ith pride and good wishes 
that the Law Schoo~l watches 
them take their place in 
the profession and dedicate 
their lives to the study and 
practice o~f law. 
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~COCKTAIL PARTY~ A\VARDS 
AT EW L W CENTER 
Law Day for St. Mary's University School of 
Law may, for the purposes of allegory, be divided 
into two phases. The first phase, the Awards Ban-
quet, is marked by the sole1nnity of honor to those 
who have already distinguished themselves in their 
profession. The second phase, the Cocktail Party, 
is more informal, but it, too, posesses a dignity in 
that it is the occasion for the awarding of honors 
to those who are yet on the brink of entering their 
profession-the law students. Students who have 
achieved scholastic distinction and who have proven 
their potential value to the legal profession are 
honored by those who are now practicing that pro-
fession. Students who have made valuable contri-
butions to the Law School as a whole, and to their 
fraternal organizations in particular, are given well-
deserved recognition by their peers. If one assumes 
the requisite point of view, a certain amount of 
validity may be seen in the idea that the first phase 
of Law Day represents the greatness of the present 
-the second phase represents the potential of the 
future. 
This idea gained additional meaning through the 
building in which the Cocktail Party was held, for 
it was held in the classroom building of the new 
Law Center which is being built to house the Law 
School. And in spite of the well-established, though 
unwritten, law that a spirit of levity must, of natur-
al causes, prevail at all cocktail parties, the reality 
of the buildings and the other buildings of the Law 
Center laced the levity with more than a little awe. 
It is one thing to see architect's drawings and to 
see photographs of buildings under construction, and 
quite another to stand inside of a promise for the 
future embodied in the concrete and steel of a build-
ing well on the way towards completion. 
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Mr. Fred Semaan presents the annual 
Lieck-Semaan Award to James P .. Lytton . 
Lloyd Bingham, winner of the United 
States "Law Week'' Award, receives the 
award from Dean Raba. 
Each year Mr. Fred Semaan and Mr. Charles 
Lieck, prominent San Antonio trial attorneys, make 
a cash award to a senior student who, in the 
opinion of the law faculty, demonstrates the great-
est potential as a trial lawyer. This year Mr. Semaan 
presented the award to Jim Lytton, who has distin-
guished himself throughout his law school career, 
having, among his many other accomplishments, 
been previously selected for inclusion in the publica-
tion "Who's Who Among Students in American 
Universities and Colleges." 
The Bureau of National affairs, Inc., of Wash-
ington, D.C. offers the United States "Law Week" 
Award to the graduating student in law who, in the 
judgment of the faculty has made the most satis-
factory progress in his final year. This year's award 
was won by Lloyd Bingham, a distinguished student 
with long-time standing on the Dean's List. 
I _ 
Marty Beirne receives Outstanding 
Freshman Award from Barrister's Club 
President Jim Lytton . 
The Barristers' Club presents annual awards to 
students of exceptional merit. The Outstanding Sen-
ior Award for this year went to Mike Moriarty, and 
the Outstanding Freshman Award was taken by 
Marty Beirne. 
Tarlton Inn of Phi Delta Phi gave recognition 
to several individuals: Mr. James Castleberry, Phi 
Delta Phi's faculty advisor, was honored for his 
contributions to the Inn; Jim Lytton was designated 
Phi Delta Phi Member of The Year; Mike Moriarty 
was Tarleton's Inn's Outstanding Graduate, and 
Marty Beirne was selected as Outstanding Freshman 
Student . 
Bickett Senate of Delta Theta Phi Awards went 
to Dick Guinn, Robert Coffin, and Michael La Hood, 
for service to their school and fraternity. The Leslie 
C. Merrem award went to Marcel C. N otzon for 
scholastic achievement and support of the Law 
School and his fraternity. The award is presented 
annually in memory of the Late Leslie C. Merrem 
who dedicated most of his life to legal education and 
in support of St. Mary's School of Law. 
Delta Alpha Delta, the Law Wives' organiza-
t ion conferred the P .H.T. (putting hubby through) 
Degrees to the wives of the graduating students. 
A wardees were: Kitty Alonso, Beverly Adams, Judy 
Ambler, Sharon Burch, Jan Wright, Carolyn Court-
ney, Sharlene Moriarty, and Carol Williams. 
Following the P .H.T. presentations, the Law 
Wives presented Mr. Paul Ferguson, St. Mary's Law 
Librarian, with a check to be used towards the pur-
chase of books for the library. 
Mike Moriarty, winner of the Barrister's 
Club Outstanding Senior Award. 
(Left to right) Delta Theta F·hi's award 
winners Marcel Notzon, Dick Guinn, 
Robert Coffin and Michael La Hood. 
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(Left to right) Mike Moriarty, Phi Delta 
Phi's Outstanding Graduate; Jim Lytton, 
Member of the Year from Phi Delta Phi; 
Marty Beirne, Phi Delta P•hi's selection 
for Outstanding Freshman Student. 
(Left to right) Edna Wright, Delta Alpha 
Delta's past president watches as Mr. 
Paul Ferguson, Law Librarian, thanks 
Delta Alpha Delta for its contribution 
to the library. Mrs. Earnest Raba and 
Mrs. Carl Walker were honored for serv-
ices to the Law Wives organization .. 
(L.eft to right) Past president of Delta Alpha D·elta stands with P.H.T. degree conferees 
Sharlene Moriarty, Jan Wright, Kitty Alo·nso, Carol Williams, Beverly Adams, and Sharon 
Burch. Carolyn Courtney, who was also a degree winner, is not pictured. 
CASE-NOTE: "Prior Testintony" Exception to the Hearsay Rule 
by Karl Rubinstein 
Recently in a case of first impression the Dallas 
Court of Civil appeals held that testimony given in 
a prior ·criminal trial by a witness since deceased is 
admissable in a subsequent civil trial under the 
"prior testimony" exception to the hearsay rule: 
BRYANT V. TRINITY UNIVERSAL INS. CO., 411 
SW2 945, (1967). 
The plaintiff, Charles D. Bryant was the owner 
of a restaurant which was destroyed by fire. He 
was tried and acquitted on a charge of arson. At 
that trial a witness, Morton K. Smith, testified to 
the effect that he had certain conversations with 
Bryant in which Bryant allegedly revealed inten-
tions to set fire to the restaurant in order to collect 
the proceeds of the insurance policies on the build-
ing and its contents. Smith testified that Bryant 
not only offered to show Smith how he planned to 
set the fire, but offered Smith $1,000 to set the fire. 
Smith said he refused. 
The instant suit was brought by Bryant to 
recover from a group of insurance companies for 
the fire loss. The companies' principal defense was 
that Bryant himself burned the property or caused 
it to be burned. Smith has since died and the court 
below permitted his testimony in the former trial 
to be read to the jury. Bryant assigned this as re-
versible error. 
The court cites McCormick and Ray, Texas Law 
of Evidence. Vol. 1, Sect. 941, pp. 719-20 as stating 
the general rule involved: "Statements made in evi-
dence upon a previous judicial proceeding may be 
received upon a subsequent trial as evidence of the 
truth of such statements where the witness who 
gave the evidence upon the former trial is now dead 
or unavailable, provided the party against whom 
the evidence is now offered (or someone else claim-
ing under the same right or title) had the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the witness at the former 
trial upon the same issue as that upon which the 
evidence is now offered." 
The court said, "So far as we can determine, 
our Texas courts have never passed on the question 
of whether, under the rule above stated, testimony 
given in a former CRIMINAL case is admissible in 
a subsequent CIVIL case involving substantially the 
sam·e issues. The supreme courts of Illinois and 
Oklahoma, however, have written on it. In Mcinturff 
V. Insurance Co. of North America, 93 NE 369 (Illi-
nois, 1910) it was held that such evidence was not 
admissible because the issue was not the same-
that in a criminal case the issue is 'guilt' and in a 
civil case the issue is 'property. ' We find ourselves 
unable to adopt that reasoning, but agree rather, 
with the reasoning of the more recent decision of 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Travelers Fire 
Ins. Co. V. Wright, 322 P2 417 (1958), holding that 
to define the issue as 'guilt' and 'property' would 
be to determine the ultimate issue or result sought 
to be obtained by the litigation, whereas the issue 
sought to be established by the witness was whether 
or not one of the plaintiffs has actually procured the 
burning of the building. 
We hold that in the instant case the issue was 
substantially the same in both cases and that since 
appellant was a party to both suits and had full 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the 
criminal trial, there was no error in admitting the 
testimony. We consider this ruling to be in harmony 
with the rules laid down by our supreme court in: 
Boyd V. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. Of Texas, 
108 SW 813; Lone Star Gas Co. V. State, 153 SW2 
681; and Houston Fire and Casualty V. Brittan, 402 
SW2 509." 
The problem surrounding the admission of 
testimony taken at a former criminal trial in a sub-
sequent civil trial is that authorities differ on the 
question of whether the parties and the issues are 
the same in a criminal trial and a civil trial to the 
degree that they are substantially similar enough 
to come within the definition of admissible former 
testimony. 
The Texas cases cited by the court are not in 
point to the exact question, but as will be seen, 
they do lay the ground work. In Boyd V. St. Louis 
Southwestern Ry. Co., 108 SW 813, testimony taken 
at a former trial was objected to as being hearsay 
because no sufficient diligence had been shown in 
attempting to procure the unavailable witness to 
authorize the introduction of the former testimony. 
The court laid down the rule that the proper predi-
cate for admission is "to show that the witness' 
whereabouts is unknown and that diligent search 
had been made to ascertain where he is." Here the 
former trial was between the same parties and on 
the same issues, and both trials were civil proceed-
ings. In Lone Star Gas Co. V. St'ate, 153 SW2 681 
(Tex. Sup. Ct., 1908) the proceedings were again 
both civil and the issues and parties were the same. 
The court merely announces the rule that: "Testi-
mony of a witness given at a former trial of the 
same case on substantially the same issues, and 
where there was opportunity for cross-examination, 
may be reproduced where it is shown that the wit-
ness is dead or that he had become insane, or is 
physically unable to testify, or is beyond the juris-
diction of the court, or that his whereabouts is un-
known and that diligent search has been made to 
ascertain where he is, or that he has been kept away 
by the adverse party." Houston Fire and Casualty 
V. Brittan (Tex. Sup. Ct., 1966) 402 SW2 509 in-
volves a question of due diligence having been exer-
cised by respondent to secure the presenee of the 
(Continued on Page 18) 
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GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS AND 
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH 
by John Courtney, May 1967 Graduate of St. Mary's law Sch ool 
Estate taxation is becoming a more important 
consideration in estate planning each year. Such 
factors as life insurance, mutual fund participation, 
certain employee profit sharing plans or pension 
trustsl and appreciation of property are placing a 
greater percentage of estates within the reach of 
the Federal Estate Tax. 
The purpose of this article is to familiarize the 
reader with the possible tax savings in advising 
property owners, whose real or personal property 
may be subject to an estate tax, of the advantages 
in making irrevocable2 gift s of such property. 
Section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954 provides that any transfer of property for less 
than a full and adequate consideration which has 
been made within three years of decedent's death 
is presumed to have been made in contemplation of 
death.3 (emphasis added). This section therefor 
raises a rebuttable presumption that any transfer 
or gift made within three y·ears of the donor's death 
was one made in contemplat ion of death. If the donor 
lives for more than three years after the transfer, 
relinquishment, exercise, or release, section 2035 
makes the transferor's motive irrelevant. Thus 
under present federal tax laws, a gift made more 
than three years before the date of death is not vul-
nerable, but one made within the three year period 
is subject to being scrutinized as a transfer to avoid 
the estate tax. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Since 1916 the ·estate tax statutes have con-
tained similar contemplation of death provisions; 
however in 1926 Congress replaced the rebuttable 
presumption with a conclu ive presumption.4 In 1932 
the Supreme Court declared the 1926 change uncon-
stitutional on the theory that to impose a tax on the 
basis of a factual assumpt ion that the taxpayer is 
not permitted to rebut is so arbitrary as to offend 
the Fifth Amendm·ent.5 Congress thereupon changed 
the conclusive presumption to a rebuttable one.6 In 
1950 the presumptive period was extended to the 
present period of three years, and the three years, 
and the three year cut off date was added. 
TRANSFEROR'S MOTIVE IN MAKING 
THE TRANSFERS 
Whether a gift made within the three year 
statutory period will in fact be subject to the estate 
tax depends upon the decedent's motivation in mak-
ing the gift. The case of United States v. Wells 283 
U.S. 102, 51 Sup Ct. 446, 75 L. Ed. 867 (1931) still 
remains the principal guide to the meaning of the 
phrase "contemplation of death." The opinion inter-
preted the phrase as not broad enough to apply to 
transfers where made with a general expectation 
of death that is entertained by all and yet not so 
narrow as to apply to gifts causa mortis. The court 
held that the statute should apply if the contempla-
tion of death was the inducing cause of the transfer. 
A federal court of appeals7 added that it may be 
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enough if thoughts of death played a "substantial" 
part in inducing the transfer. Federal Estate Tax 
Regulations provide: 
A transfer in "contemplation of death" is a dis-
position of property prompted by the thought 
of death (although it need not be solely so 
prompted). A transfer is prompted by the 
thought of death if (1) made with the purpose 
of avoiding death taxes, (2) made as a ~ubsti­
tute for a testam·entary disposition of the prop-
erty, or (3) made for any other motive asso-
ciated with death. The bodily and mental con-
dition of the decedent and all other attendant 
facts and circumstances are to be scrutinized 
in order to determine whether or not such 
thought prompted the disposition.s 
The fact that gift and estate tax savings are dis-
cussed at the time decedent makes the transfer 
does not require a holding that the gift was in con-
templation of death, so long as the saving of taxes 
was not the generating motive of the gift.9 
MOTIVES HELD NOT TO BE IN 
"OONTEMPLATION OF DEATH" 
Circumstances such as the transferor's age, 
health, and frame of mind are relevant and may be 
considered in determining the transferor's intent 
although they are by no means conclusive. Gifts 
and transfers made within the three year period 
by donors in their nineties1o, or those with a ter-
minal illness11, have been held not to have been made 
"in contemplation of death", Examples of lifetime 
or living motives which have defeated assertions of 
contemplation of death are where the pri'mary 
motive in making the gift was to provide indepen-
dent income or security for the donor·s depen-
dents, 12, transfers to settle family disputes,13 trans-
fers to relinquish control over property or put con-
templated plans into effect,14 gifts motivated by a 
desire to help establish the donee in business or 
make them financially independent,15 and the exist-
ence of a long established giftmaking policy on the 
part of the donee. In the final anlysis, the conclu-
sion as to the decedent's motive usually must be 
extracted from evidentiary facts that yield highly 
conflicting inferences. 
~GIFTS OF EXISTING LIFE INSURANCE 
POLICIES 
Life insurance policies have certain unique ele-
ments which may make them especially suitable as 
the subject of life time gifts. The gift tax on life 
insurance is based on the policies net worth. 
Internal Revenue Code Section 2042 includes 
the decedent's gross estate the value of all isur-
ance on decedent's life receivable by the executor 
of his estate or amounts receivable by beneficiaries 
from insuranc-e on his life where the decedent " . .. 
possessed at his death any of the incidents of owner-
ship exercisable either alone or in conjunction with 
any other person." Examples of "incidents of owner-
ship" under the Estate tax regulation are the power 
to: 
(1) change the beneficiary, 
(2) surrender or cancel the policy, 
(3) assign the policy, or revoke the policy, 
( 4) pledge the policy for a loan, 
( 5) obtain a loan based upon the cash surren-
der value of the policy16 
As to the testamentary nature of life insurance the 
court in Hull's Estate V. C.I.R. (3rd Circuit; 1963) 
325 F.2nd 367 held: 
"Nor does it strengthen the Commissioner's 
position that the property was lif·e insurance. 
That fact does not make the transfer inherently 
testamentary, Estate of Aaron V. Commissioner, 
3d Cir. 1955, 224 F. 2d 314, particularly in a 
case like this where full ownership rights were 
transferred unconditionally, and the policies had 
substantial cash value." 
The court then reviewed the evidence and deter-
mined that the gift of life insurance was not made 
in contemplation of death. 
LAY THE GROUNDWORK NOW! 
The Internal Revenue Service announced that 
it will not issue an advance ruling on any matters 
"involving the prospective application of the estate 
tax to the property or the estate of a living person." 
Expressly included in such matters is the question 
"whether a transaction is one in contemplation of 
death' ~17 The executor or other repres·entative of the 
estate will have a decided advantage if the transfer-
or takes some precautions when the gift is made. In 
every contemplation of death action the ultimate 
issue is the donor's subjective intention. Thus, if 
the donor has a bona fide life or living motive in 
making the gratuitous transfer, he should be sure 
his motive is properly preserved. The gift should 
be made in the presence of witnesses where the 
donor ·expresses the purpose of the gift. It is ad-
.visable to avoid making the gift at time of making 
one's will, or in leaving a donee who is the natural 
object of testator's bounty18 out of the will altogether. 
WHAT RIGHTS MAY THE DONOR RETAIN IN 
THE TRANSFERRED PROPERTY AND .AT 
SAME TIME KEEP THE PROPERTY 
OUT OF THE GROSS ESTATE? 
If you are persuaded to utilize the available tax 
saving life time gratuitous transfers, allow me to 
caution you to carefully ready sections 2038, 2036, 
and 2037. Section 2038 provides that a decedent's 
gross estate includes the values of any interest in 
property transferred by decedent, if the enjoyment 
of the interest was subj-ect at the decedent's death 
to any change through the exercise of a power by 
decedent to ALTER, AMEND, REVOKE, OR TER-
MINATE THE TRANSFER. (Certain limited "as-
certainable standards" exceptions) 19. Section 2036 
includes in the decedent's gross estate the value of 
any interest if the decedent retained or reserved 
the right to the USE, POSSESSION, OR RIGHT TO 
THE INCOME OF THE TRANSFERRED property, 
(1) for his life, or (2) any period not ascertainable 
without reference to his death, or (3) for any period 
which does not end before his death. Section 2037 
provides that decedent's gross estate includes the 
value of the interest which the beneficiary can 
achieve only whereby he survives the donor and the 
donor retained a reversionary interest therein 
amounting to more than five percent of the value 
of the property. The sketching of the above sections 
is provided only to indicate that the lawyer must 
consider in advising the prospective donor. 
ESTATE AND 1GIFT TAXES OOMPARED 
A comparison of the gift tax and the estate tax 
rates provided for each bracket will show the gift 
tax rates to be exactly 75 % of the estate tax rates. 
For example, the lowest estate tax rate is 3 per 
cent and the lowest gift tax rate is 21;4 percent. The 
highest estate tax tax rate is 77 per cent, and the 
highest gift tax rate is 573/4 per cent. Rates for 
each bracket consistently bear this four-to-three 
relationship. The lawyer can also advise of the ad-
vantages of exclusions and deductions available each 
year to the donor. 
OONCLUSION 
If there be a doubt as to whether or not one 
will succeed in keeping a transfer of property out 
of the state, make the transfer anyway. Nothing 
is lost, even though a gift tax may have been paid 
on the transfer, since the credit for such tax will 
be allowed under section 2012 in preparing the estate 
tax return. Moreover, such gift tax if unpaid at 
time of decedents death may be included in deduc-
tions from the gross estate. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. Sec. 2039 (c) provides that certain qualified profit sharing plans 
and annuities are not includable. But see recent Internal Revenu e 
Ruling 67-37 making 2039 (c) inapplicable where the employee 
d ecedent h ad certain lifetime rights under the plan. 
2. See IRS Sec. 2038. 
3. "Any Transfer" includes any relinquishment, exercise or release 
of a general power of appointment or other interest in property. 
4. Rev Act of 1926 Sec. 302(c), 44 Stat 9, 70. 
5. Heiner v Doonan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932). 
6. Rev Act of 1932 Sec 803(a) 47 Stat 169, 279. 
7. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v Bowers, 98 F2d 794 (CA 2d 1938), 
Cert. den. 306 US 648 (1939). 
8. Treasury regulations Section 20.2035-1 (c). 
9. Allen v Trust Company of Georgia, Executor (1946) 326 US 630 
66 S. Ct. 389, 90 L. Ed. 367. 
10. Estate of Wm. M. Murphy v U.S. D.C. West Dist Mo 64 USTC 
Sec 12,244 (decedent in ill h ealth and 95 years of age). Estate of 
C. B. Kniskean 232 F. Supp 7 (decedent 99 years of age at time 
of gifts of cash and stock had the intention to see his grand-
children enjoy the gifts during his lifetime; HELD gifts were 
made with motives associated with life and not death. 
11. Decedent at time of transfer of $1,000,000 was 77 years of age and 
in poor health. He died 10 months after making the gifts. Held-
the predominant motive in making the transfer was to be able 
to remarry without subjecting the property, the subject of the 
gift, to the control of his second wife and therefor the property 
was not includable in his estate. Lippincott et al. vs Commissioner 
7 F2d 788 (1934). 
12. Estate of Carl C. Lynch v Commissioner 35 T.C. 142 (1962) dece-
dent knew at time of transfer that he had terminal cancer. See 
also Boyd, Exec v U.S. (D. C. Kentucky; 1961) 192 F. Supp 601 
(1960). 
13. See note 10 above. 
14. Hoover, Exec v U.S. 190 F. Supp 601 (1960). 
15. Clark v U.S. 209 F. Supp 895 (1962). 
16. Treasury Regulations 20.2042 (c) (2) . 
17. Revenue Procedure 62-32, 1962-2 C.B. 527. 
18. Davidson's Estate v Commissioner, 158 F. 2d 239 (10th Cir 1946). 
(Gifts in trust contemporaneous with execution of will; held 
" integrated parts of a single plan, testamentary in nature".) 
19. Examples of adequate external standards are: (a) invasion of 
principal in case of need for educational purposes or because of 
illness or any other good reason: (b) maintenance, education and 
support in the manner appropriate to station in life. Examples of 
standards held not to b e adequate are the use of such words as 
"circumstances deemed by the trustee-settlor to be necessary", or 
"happiness of the beneficiaries". 
20. See Treasury regulations Section 20.2001-1 and Section 25.2502-1 
(b ). 
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CASE-NOTE (Continued from Page 13) 
witness whose former testimony he wishes to in-
troduce. The court cites Lone Star Gas V. State, 
supra, and says "We adhere to the established rule 
as stated in Lone Star Gas." Here again both cases 
were civil and the parties and issues are the same. 
Thes·e three cases, and McCormick & Ray, 
Supra, set out the requirements which must be met 
in order for testimony taken at a former trial to be 
admissible in a subsequent trial under the "prior 
testimony·' exception to the hearsay rule. An im-
portant point is that in all o.f these cases the prior 
trial and subsequent trial were both civil proceed-
ings. The significance of the court's statement that 
it considers its decision, which follows the Okla-
homa rule, to be in harmony with these three cases 
lies in the fact that it seemingly recognizes no differ-
ences between a criminal and civil case in regard to 
the admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial, 
and that the only requirements which must be met 
in Texas are those set out in the cases above and 
the character of the proceeding-civil or criminal-
is seemingly irrelevant. 
Since the point had never before arisen in 
Texas, the court was forced to go to other j urisdic-
tions to determine the correct rule. There are two 
views in the United States both of which agree 
on the essential requirements which must be met. 
But the point of divergence comes on the interpre-
tation given two of the requirements: "identity of 
parties,'' and "identity of issues." The Mcinturff 
Case, cited in the Bryant Case, is fairly representa-
tive of the minority view which requires strict ad-
herence to the requirements of identical parties and 
identical issues. In Mcinturff, the Illinois court said 
that the common law rule relating to the admission 
of former testimony means that the parties and 
issues in the subsequent action must be strictly the 
same in both proceedings and that since the parties 
in a criminal proceeding are not the same as the 
parties in a civil action (the former consisting of 
the State and the Defendant and the latter consist-
ing of the Plaintiff and the Defendant) the testi-
mony given in a criminal case is not admissible in 
a subsequent civil proceeding ·even though the wit-
ness who testified is no longer accessable, and the 
transaction in question is identical. Mcinturff also 
holds, and cites Harger V. Thomas, 44 Pa. 128, as 
authority that the issues are not the same : that 
"guilt'~is the issue in a criminal case and "property" 
is the issue in a civil case. 
The n1ajority view is represented by the Okla-
h.oma .decision in Travelers Fire Ins. Co. V. Wright, 
cited In the Bryant Case, which rejects thes·e ideas 
saying that the parties are substantially similar 
and that the issue is the same: whether or not th~ 
defendant did the act with which he is accused or 
which is bejng asserted against him as a defense. 
The point is annotated in 46 ALR 463: "The 
weight of authority seems to be to the effect that 
on a proper showing of inability to procure the at-
tendence of a witness at the trial of a civil case, 
his testimony given in a criminal pros·ecution in-
volving the same transaction is admissable against 
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the person who was defendent therein." The anno-
tation lists Iowa, New York, South Dakota and W~sconsin as being ?f this majority view; and Illi-
nois .an.d P~nnsylvanm as being the minority against 
adinis~wn In such cases. This annotation, however, 
has since been superseded by an annotation in 
79 ALR 1179, but the result is the same; there are 
sm1ply more adherents to both views. The annota-
tion .lists the _following among the majority: Cali-
forn~a, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Mis-
soun, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South 
Dal~ota. ~ho~e states who do not admit are: Pennsyl-
vania, Ilhnms, South Carolina, and Louisiana. 
UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS-
(Continued from Page 7) 
In the new Hampshire case of American Home 
Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver,9 Plaintiff contracted 
with Defendant for some ' home improvements. At 
the same time the contract was executed Defen-
dant signed an application for financing to ~finance 
company which contained a blank note and blank 
power of attorney to the finance company. The ap-
plication stated the total amount due, the number 
of months that payments were to be made and the 
monthly payments, but did not state the rate of 
interest. Several days later Defendant received no-
tice of the approval of the application for financincr 
which stated that the monthly payments would b: 
~42.81 per month for 60 months including principal, 
Interest and insurance-making a total payment of 
$2,568.00 or an "increase of $809.00" over the con-
tract price. Defendant immediatedly notified the 
Plaintiff to cease work and Plaintiff then filed suit 
for breach of contract. The court he~d, as an alter-
nate ground of decision, that the contract was un-
conscionable within Section 2-302 on grounds of price 
alone. 
In another very recent case, the Attorney Gen-
er~l. of New York was held to have the right to 
enJOin Defendant from engaging in an endless chain 
transaction consisting of a referral type of sales 
program whereby consumers were induced to pur-
chase the products at 2 to 6 times higher than 
th.e promoter's costs.1° The Defendant fraudulently 
misrepresented that the goods were not obtainable 
elsewhere at those prices when in fact the croods wer~ a:railable elsewhere and at much lower p~ices. 
In finding that the price provisions of the contract 
were unconscionable within Section 2-302 the court 
stated that "No longer do we believe that 'fraud may 
be perpetrated by the cry of 'caveat emptor'. We 
have reached the point where 'Let the buyer beware' 
is .a poor business philosophy for a social order 
allegedly based upon man's respect for his fellow 
man. Let the seller beware too!" 
FOOTNOTES 
8. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y. Supp. 2nd 757 (1966 ) 
9. American Home Improvement v. Maciver, 105 N.H . 435, 201 A.2d 
886 (1964) . 
10. In re State of New York, 275 N.Y. Supp. 2d 303 (1966 ). 
DEVELOPMENT 
CORNER 
A Close-up of the Library ... 
And the class room building. 
The new Law Center takes form: 
The Faculty offices ... 
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Are you a senior law student or a new 
attorney? 
Looking for your first professional position or 
best location for your office? 
Do you know which foundation books to select 
for your library? 
There's an expert in your vicinity who can help 
you with these and other questions you may have 
that concern your practice. He __ makes it his 
business to know opportunities occurring in your 
area. 
Just drop us a line .and we'll send you his nante 
and address. Then contact him to see how much 
his tips h2lp you. 
You could turn his information in to your business. 
No charge or obligation whatever for this advice. 
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